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During adolescence, peers take on increasing importance, while social skills are still
developing. However, how emotions of peers inﬂuence social decisions during that
age period is insufﬁciently known. We therefore examined the effects of three different
emotional responses (anger, disappointment, happiness) on decisions about fairness in
a sample of 156 adolescents aged 12–17 years. Participants received written emotional
responses from peers in a version of the Dictator Game to a previous unfair offer.
Adolescents reacted with more generous offers after disappointed reactions compared to
angry and happy reactions. Furthermore, we found preliminary evidence for developmental
differences over adolescence, since older adolescents differentiated more between the
three emotions than younger adolescents. In addition, individual differences in social
value orientation played a role in decisions after happy reactions of peers to a previous
unfair offer, such that participants with a “proself” orientation made more unfair offers to
happy peers than “prosocial” participants. Taken together, our ﬁndings demonstrate that
adolescents take emotions of peers into account when making social decisions, while
individual differences in social value orientation affect these decisions, and age seems to
inﬂuence the nature of the reaction.
Keywords: interpersonal effects of emotions, adolescence, social value orientation, dictator game, social
interactions, development
INTRODUCTION
Emotions play a pivotal role in social interactions, particularly
during adolescence, a life stage of signiﬁcant social development
(Blakemore, 2008). For instance, research in adults showed that
being in a happy mood themselves makes people rely more on
available cues and schemas about their interaction partner (Lount,
2010) and makes them more cooperative in negotiations (e.g.,
Forgas, 1998). In addition, emotions expressed by others also
affect the perceiver’s behavior in (further) interactions with the
expresser (Parkinson, 1996; Van Kleef et al., 2010). These inter-
personal effects of others’ emotions have not yet been studied in
adolescence and are therefore the focus of the current study.
Social functional accounts of emotions (e.g., Frijda, 1986;
Parkinson, 1996; Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Morris and Keltner,
2000; Elfenbein, 2007; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010) posit
that one important function of emotion expression is communi-
cation to inﬂuence the behavior of others. Expressed emotions –
either facial, verbal, or postural – may trigger affective reactions
and inferences about the other person that inﬂuence subsequent
social interactions with this person (Van Kleef, 2009).
In adults, interpersonal effects of emotions have been fruit-
fully investigated innegotiation settings and allocation games (e.g.,
Van Kleef et al., 2004; Kopelman et al., 2006; Lelieveld et al., 2012;
for a review, see Van Kleef et al., 2010). Generally, these stud-
ies have demonstrated that bargainers react differently to distinct
emotional expressions when responding to others. However, the
effects of emotions may depend on the situational context and can
be inﬂuenced by individual personality differences such as social
value orientation.
INTERPERSONAL EFFECTS OF ANGER, DISAPPOINTMENT, AND
HAPPINESS
The emotions used in the current study include anger, disappoint-
ment and happiness. These three emotions were selected because
they enable us to compare both the effects of negative and positive
communicated emotions, as well as the effects of different types of
negative emotions (anger vs. disappointment). Studying discrete
emotional expressions is important since they carry more infor-
mation than the more vague and diffuse (negative vs. positive)
category of moods (Frijda, 1986; Van Kleef et al., 2010). Another
reason to include anger, disappointment, and happiness in this
study is that we wanted to know if results for adolescents would
differ from the results of adults in a previous study by Lelieveld
et al. (2013a).
When being confronted with anger, the perceiver’s affective
reactions may cause reciprocal anger (leading to competition)
or complementary fear (leading to concessions; Lelieveld et al.,
2012). Furthermore, someone else’s anger can also lead to the
conclusion that it might be more beneﬁcial to concede before
the situation will escalate. Indeed people make higher conces-
sions to angry compared to happy opponents, because of the
toughness communicated by the angry person (Van Kleef et al.,
2004). However, communicating anger from a low power posi-
tion (i.e., when having a low inﬂuence on the other’s outcomes)
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might backﬁre; in these situations the angry recipient gets offered
less (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Lelieveld et al., 2013a). Although disap-
pointment – like anger – is a negative emotion, its interpersonal
effects differ from the effects of anger. The few studies on the
interpersonal effects of disappointment have shown that commu-
nicated disappointment invokes feelings of guilt (Lelieveld et al.,
2013b), leading to higher offers compared to communicated anger
(Van Kleef et al., 2006; Lelieveld et al., 2011, 2012). Finally, happy
reactions in negotiations may lead to increased liking and higher
subsequent offers in cooperative settings. In more competitive
settings people will infer that the happy other is satisﬁed, which
will take away the need to concede and encourage lower offers
(Van Kleef et al., 2004, 2010).
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES
The interpersonal effects of emotions may partly depend on indi-
vidual personality differences. One important personality trait
that has consistently been shown to inﬂuence one’s bargaining
behavior (e.g., McClintock and Liebrand, 1988; Parks, 1994; Van
Lange et al., 2007), and, more speciﬁcally, the impact of emotions
of others on one’s bargaining position (e.g., Van Kleef and Van
Lange, 2008), is a person’s social value orientation (SVO; Messick
and McClintock, 1968). Social value orientation is the disposi-
tional preference for distributions of outcomes for the beneﬁt of
either self or others. Persons with a prosocial SVO try to maximize
both one’s own outcomes and the other’s outcomes and to mini-
mize differences in outcomes for themselves and others. Proselfs
are more interested in maximizing differences between themselves
and others (i.e., competition) or they are solely concerned about
their own outcomes with little or no interest in others’ outcomes
(i.e., individualism; Van Lange et al., 1997). One previous study
found that proselfs were more likely to concede than prosocials
after a disappointed reaction from the other player in a multi-
round negotiation, likely due to strategic motivations (Van Kleef
and Van Lange, 2008). In order to look at the direct effects of the
communicated emotions on prosocials and proselfs, we will inves-
tigate the interpersonal effects of emotions in a situation without
strategic considerations (i.e., in the case of the Dictator Game). In
such situations one might expect prosocials to be more affected by
other’s emotions, because they are more empathic than proselfs
(Declerck and Bogaert, 2008). To test this hypothesis, we decided
to consider the effects of social value orientation in the current
study.
INTERPERSONAL EFFECTS OF EMOTIONS IN ADOLESCENCE
Research with allocation games in the domain of interpersonal
effects of emotions has mainly focused on adults. To our knowl-
edge, no previous study has focused on the interpersonal effects
of emotions in adolescence. However, studying this topic during
adolescence is relevant for several reasons. First, notable social
changes are seen during this life stage. There is an increased
focus on peer relationships and an improvement in social skills
that are used to form more complex social relations (Steinberg
and Morris, 2001). Second, some studies suggest that the capac-
ity to recognize facial emotions of all six basic emotions (i.e.,
happiness, sadness, anger, fear, disgust, and surprise) is still devel-
oping throughout adolescence and into adulthood (e.g.,McGivern
et al., 2002; Herba and Phillips, 2004; Wade et al., 2006; Thomas
et al., 2007). Hence, it might be harder for (younger) adolescents
to differentiate between emotions. Third, adolescents increas-
ingly take the situational context, such as the perspective of
their interaction partner, into account during social interactions.
Changes in fairness views continue to impact sharing in alloca-
tion games throughout adolescence (Crone, 2013). For example,
when allowed to distribute jointly earned resources, older ado-
lescents share more with peers that earned more (Almås et al.,
2010). Older adolescents also make more use of knowledge about
the intentions of others when offering money or when evaluating
offers made by others (Gürog˘lu et al., 2009). Moreover, an increase
in social cognitive abilities with adolescence has also been shown in
other complex perspective-taking tasks (Dumontheil et al., 2010)
and the capacity to attribute mental states to others (i.e., theory of
mind) has been found to improve during and beyond adolescence.
For example, older adolescents are faster at attributing emotional
mental states to others than younger adolescents (Keulers et al.,
2010) and adolescents make more errors than adults when eval-
uating complex theory of mind stories (Vetter et al., 2012). In
order to bring these ﬁndings together, we studied how adoles-
cents use emotional information from peers during allocation
games. This can be an important novel approach to character-
ize the effects of emotions of peers during social interactions in
adolescence.
THE CURRENT STUDY
In the current study, we therefore investigated interpersonal effects
of emotions on allocations in adolescence. We used a procedure
developed by Lelieveld et al. (2013a), inwhichwe examined partic-
ipants’ choices in a Dictator Game after receiving verbal emotional
reactions from a peer (depicting disappointment, anger, or happi-
ness) to a previous unfair offer. In the Dictator Game (Kahneman
et al., 1986), one player divides an amount of money between one-
self and another player. The other player is forced to accept this
– the dictator’s – offer. The Dictator Game allows one to study
the interpersonal effects of emotions in a clear and controlled set-
ting. Allocators do not need to consider whether a low offer will
be rejected (as opposed to the Ultimatum Game, where the other
player can reject the offer), which minimizes the interference of
strategic motivations.
This study will test the following hypotheses. First, in line with
the results fromLelieveld et al. (2013a),wehypothesized that angry
reactions from peers to a previous unfair offer would lead to more
unfair offers compared to receiving happy statements in response
to identical unfair offers (Van Dijk et al., 2008; Lelieveld et al.,
2013a). In addition, we expected less unfair offers in reaction to
disappointed compared to angry reactions because disappoint-
ment leads to a concern for the outcomes of others (Lelieveld
et al., 2011, 2012, 2013a). Second, we explored age differences in
the amount of unfair offers for the three distinct emotions. Given
the increasing incorporation of the situational context with age
(Gürog˘lu et al., 2009; Almås et al., 2010; Dumontheil et al., 2010)
and adolescents’heightened susceptibility to peer inﬂuence (Gard-
ner and Steinberg, 2005), we explored if older adolescents would
differentiate more between the three emotions than younger ado-
lescents. Third, we investigated effects of individual differences in
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SVO(i.e., prosocials vs. proselfs). Previous research has shown that
the effects of disappointment depend on a person’s SVO (VanKleef
andVan Lange, 2008), which we extend by examining the effects of
SVO on anger, disappointment as well as happiness. We expected
participants with a proself orientation to make more unfair offers
compared to participants with a prosocial orientation and to dif-
ferentiate less between the emotional expressions of others (cf.
Van Lange et al., 1997).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Theﬁnal sample of participants included 156 adolescents (76 girls)
aged 12.41–17.75 years (M = 15.17, SD= 1.22)whowere recruited
from local secondary schools in The Netherlands. All had then
experienced a social change from primary to secondary school.
Participants were recruited from schools whose populations have
common Dutch ethnicity. Self-report indicated that 97.4% of the
participants was born in The Netherlands and that 79.6% had
two parents with a Dutch background; 22.4% had at least one
parent that was born in another country. No information about
socioeconomic status and (history of) psychiatric disorders was
collected. In total, 209 eligible participants initially took part in
the study, of which 19 were excluded because they did not choose
an unfair option in the ﬁrst phase of the experiment (see below).
Of the remaining 190 participants, there was incomplete data for
28 participants due to computer problems, who were therefore
excluded from further analyses. A 10-min time limited version
of the Standard Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven et al., 1998)
was administered to assess ﬂuid reasoning skills in order to obtain
an estimate of general intellectual ability. Since we used a time
limited version of theRaven, raw test scoreswere used. Participants
who scored more than 2 SD from the mean on this measure were
excluded from further analysis (N = 6), because we wanted our
participants to be of comparable intelligence. Informed consent
was obtained from all participants and from primary caregivers.
EXPERIMENTAL TASK
Using a procedure developed by Lelieveld et al. (2013a), we exam-
ined participants’ choices in a Dictator Game after receiving
emotional reactions to a previous unfair offer from others.
Phase one
In the ﬁrst phase of the experiment, participants read a sce-
nario presented on paper in which they negotiated for a company.
They were instructed to divide 10 tokens between themselves and
another person. Participants chose between two predetermined
distributions of the 10 tokens in two different scenarios. First, they
had to choose between a 6–4 distribution in favor of themselves
and a 5–5 equal distribution. Second, participants chose between
a 6–4 distribution in favor of themselves and a 4–6 distribution in
favor of the other. The negotiation scenario was meant to create
a business setting, in order to assure that most participants chose
the 6–4 option in this phase of the study. We wrote in the sce-
nario that we are researchers interested in monetary negotiations
by companies that try to maximize their proﬁts, and that we are
interested in how youths think about these negotiations. Adoles-
cents were instructed to imagine which option they would choose
if they were part of a company and had to make a proﬁt.
Indeed, most participants (190 participants out of 209) chose
a 6–4 distribution in at least one of the two scenarios. To ensure
credibility of the second phase, only these 190 participants took
part in phase two of the experiment.
Phase two
The second phase took place 1 week after the ﬁrst phase, to sup-
port the credibility of the researchers collecting reactions from
others to the offer. In this phase, participants were told that their
unfair offer (the 6–4 distribution) was presented to 60 same-aged
peers who were given the opportunity to write out their reac-
tion upon receiving the offer. In reality, the 60 reactions were
pre-programmed and rated for emotional signiﬁcance in a pilot-
study with adult participants (see Lelieveld et al., 2013a). On each
trial, participants read one of the reactions to the unfair offer,
presented on a computer screen. Subsequently, they played a ver-
sion of the Dictator Game with the person who provided the
emotional reaction, in which participants were again allocators
in a Dictator Game and divided 10 tokens. Participants could
now choose between a 7–3 distribution (i.e., 7 tokens for them-
selves and 3 for the other) and a 5–5 distribution. We did not
include a 6–4 distribution, to ensure that a desire to be consis-
tent with the participants’ ﬁrst offer did not inﬂuence the results.
We emphasized that the (simulated) recipients did not know that
their written reactions would be sent back to the participant to
ensure that participants trusted the emotional reactions to be
non-strategic (i.e., not aimed to inﬂuence the participant’s new
offer). There was no business setting in this phase anymore; par-
ticipants now played as individuals. They were told that they
would play for real money and that after the experiment, three
participants from every class would be selected by a computer
to get some rounds actually paid out. Since participants were
playing for real money (at least some of their rounds could get
paid out), we have no reason to assume participants did not
believe the cover story. Additionally, participants in the Lelieveld
et al. (2013a) did not express any doubts about the cover story
either.
On each trial, participants were paired with a different player,
whose ﬁrst name (indicating gender) was provided. Emotional
reactions were either angry, disappointed, or happy. Examples of
emotional reactions depicting anger were “I feel really angry after
receiving this offer,” “This annoying person really pisses me off,”
and “I am starting to get really furious right now.” Examples of
reactions depicting disappointment were “This really disappoints
me,” “I expected more from the other person,” and “I am really
disappointed in the other person.”Examples of reactions depicting
happiness were “I am really happy with this offer,” “The other
person made my day,” and “This is perfect, I am really satisﬁed”
(see also Lelieveld et al., 2013a).
QUESTIONNAIRES
Social value orientation
We measured social value orientation (Messick and McClin-
tock, 1968) with a nine-item questionnaire developed by Van
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Lange et al. (1997). Participants can choose from three differ-
ent options to allocate valuable points between themselves and
a recipient. Responses can be categorized in accordance with three
different social value orientations: “prosocials,” who maximize
outcomes for themselves and the recipient and minimize differ-
ences between these outcomes; “individualists,” who maximize
their own outcomes without regard for the recipient’s outcomes;
and “competitors” who maximize their own outcomes relative to
the recipient’s outcomes. Participants were classiﬁed into one of
these categories when they made six or more consistent choices.
Participants who did not meet this requirement were excluded
from further analyses that investigated relations with SVO. Sim-
ilar to several previous studies (e.g., De Cremer and Van Vugt,
1999; Olekalns and Smith, 1999; Joireman and Duell, 2005; Van
Dijk and De Cremer, 2006; Van Kleef and Van Lange, 2008),
we chose to combine individualists and competitors into one
category, the “proselfs,” in order to compare self-interest and
collective interest. In our sample, 35% of the participants were
classiﬁed as prosocials, 50% as proself, and 15% could not be
classiﬁed.
RESULTS
For phase two of the experimental task, several participants
informed us that the experiment was too long and that toward
the end of the task, it became difﬁcult to still concentrate on the
emotional reactions. To ensure that we were analyzing meaningful
results, we decided before any analyses were performed to limit
our analyses to the ﬁrst 30 trials. We made this decision based
on a trade-off between statistical power and motivation of par-
ticipants. By analyzing only half the trials, we ensured in the best
possible way that participants were sufﬁciently motivated for all
trials while still retaining statistical power. Our analyses on these
trials showed that when collapsing all types of emotional reactions
together, participants chose an unfair 7–3 distribution in a mean
of 49% of the trials (SD = 19%).
To check for differences in unfair choices between the three
emotional reactions, we performed a repeated-measures analysis
of variance (ANOVA) with emotion (anger vs. disappointment vs.
happiness) as a within-subjects variable and percentage of unfair
choices as the dependent variable. This analysis yielded a main
effect of emotion, F(2,310) = 4.58, p = 0.02, η2 = 0.03. Least
signiﬁcant difference (LSD) post hoc tests showed that partici-
pants chose the unfair option more often when dealing with angry
recipients (M = 51%, SD = 33%, p < 0.001) or happy recipi-
ents (M = 53%, SD = 31%, p = 0.01) than when dealing with
disappointed recipients (M = 43%, SD = 31%). In other words,
disappointed reactions of a peer to a previous unfair offer led to
more generous offers than angry or happy reactions. There was no
difference in the amountof unfair offers for angry andhappy recip-
ients (p = 0.53). Although we did not expect any sex differences we
explored an effect of sex, which was not found, F(2,308) = 0.52,
p = 0.52, η2 = 0.003.
To investigate the time course of the responses for the differ-
ent emotions, we compared the percentage of unfair offers per
emotion for the ﬁrst trial and the last trial (i.e., the 10th trial
for each emotion). A repeated-measures ANOVA with emotion
and trial number as between-subjects variables indicated that
there was a slight interaction between emotion and trial num-
ber, F(2,310) = 3.06, p = 0.051. This indicates that there was a
marginally signiﬁcant effect of trial number, i.e., that there were
differences in the percentage of unfair offers per emotion over the
course of the task. Because this effect is quite small and we aver-
aged over 10 responses per emotion, we expect that the effect of
trial number is relatively small.
AGE EFFECTS
Collapsed over all emotions, no correlation was found between the
total amount of unfair distributions and age (r = 0.10, p = 0.21).
We also checked for effects of age for the three emotions separately,
by performing a repeated-measures ANOVA with emotion (anger
vs. disappointment vs. happiness) as awithin-subjects variable and
percentage of unfair choices as the dependent variable, with age as
a covariate. No effects of agewere found,F(2,308)= 1.34, p= 0.26,
η2 = 0.01. We also divided our sample in three similar sized age
groups: young adolescents (M = 13.75 years, SD = 0.65 years),
mid adolescents (M = 15.29 years, SD = 0.32 years), and late ado-
lescents (M = 16.49 years, SD = 0.40 years). See Table 1 for details
about the age groups. There was no signiﬁcant difference between
the age groups for sex, χ2 = 2.26, p = 0.32, SVO, χ2 = 0.07,
p = 0.97, and Raven scores, F(2,132) = 1.01, p = 0.37, η2 = 0.02.
No signiﬁcant interaction was found for the three emotions and
age group, F(4,306) = 1.11, p = 0.34, η2 = 0.01 (see Figure 1).
However, based on our expectations that younger adolescents
would differentiate less between the different emotions than older
adolescents, we looked at the interpersonal effects of emotions
for each age group separately. We conducted a repeated-measures
ANOVA with emotion (anger vs. disappointment vs. happiness)
as a within-subjects variable and percentage of unfair choices as
the dependent variable separately for each age group. We found
no main effect of emotion in young adolescents, F(2,102) = 0.02,
p = 0.92, η2 < 0.001, but we did ﬁnd a trend for mid adolescents,
F(2,104) = 3.22, p = 0.06, η2 = 0.06, and a signiﬁcant effect for
late adolescents, F(2,100) = 3.57, p = 0.05, η2 = 0.07. LSD post
hoc tests indicated that for young adolescents none of the effects
of the emotions differed from each other, that for mid adolescents,
disappointment differed from anger (p = 0.001) and happiness
(p = 0.04), and that for late adolescents, disappointment also
differed from anger (p = 0.005) and happiness (p = 0.03). The
effects of anger and happiness did not differ from each other in
any age group (all ps > 0.05). Figure 1 depicts the means for
each age group, and shows that with increasing age, adolescents
seem the differentiate more between the three emotions. That
is, the emotions seem to affect the adolescents differently with
increasing age.
EFFECTS OF SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION
Collapsed over all emotions, prosocials made less unfair offers
than proselfs, although this effect is slightly above signiﬁcance
level, t(130) = 1.92, p = 0.057, d = 0.34. Furthermore, a
repeated-measures ANOVA with emotion as a within-subjects
variable and social value orientation (proself vs. prosocial) as a
between-subjects variable yielded a signiﬁcant interaction effect,
F(2,260) = 4.37, p = 0.03, η2 = 0.03 (see Figure 2). Follow-up
t-test comparisons indicated that proselfs proposed more unfair
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Table 1 | Demographic characteristics of the three age groups.
Age group Young adolescents Mid adolescents Late adolescents
N 52 53 51
Age range 12.41–14.69 14.78–15.89 15.92–17.75
Mean age (SD) 13.75 (0.65) 15.29 (0.33) 16.49 (0.40)
N females 22 25 29
N proself SVO 26 26 26
N prosocial SVO 17 19 18
Mean % unfair (SD) 47.37 (18.29) 50.13 (20.58) 49.74 (17.28)
Mean raven (SD) 34.06 (6.13) 35.62 (5.50) 35.57 (6.43)
FIGURE 1 | Percentage of unfair offers for the three emotions, separate for three age groups. Single asterisk (∗) indicates p < 0.05; double asterisk (∗∗)
indicates p < 0.01.
FIGURE 2 | Percentage of unfair offers for the three emotions, separate for prosocial and proself SVO.Triple asterisk (∗∗∗) indicates p < 0.001.
offers than prosocials, but only after happy emotional reactions,
t(130) = 3.68, p < 0.001, d = 0.67. We found no age effects
for this analysis, that is, no further interactions of SVO and age
were found. We also performed these analyses separate for the
three age groups. We only found an interaction between emotion
and SVO in the late adolescent group, F(2,84) = 4.61, p = 0.03,
η2 = 0.10. Follow up t-test comparisons showed that this effect
is again due to proselfs proposing more unfair offers than proso-
cials, but only after happy reactions, t(42) = 3.04, p = 0.004,
d = 0.9.
DISCUSSION
In this study we investigated adolescents’ choices in a Dictator
Game after receiving angry, disappointed, and happy emotional
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 745 | 5
“fnhum-07-00745” — 2013/11/10 — 23:57 — page 6 — #6
Klapwijk et al. Emotions inﬂuence fairness in adolescence
reactions from others to an unfair offer. We found that adoles-
cents took information about emotional reactions into account
when they were allocating resources. Even though the participant
had a lower payoff for the fair than for the unfair option, disap-
pointed reactions led to more generous offers than angry or happy
reactions. Happy reactions were more likely to evoke a tendency
to act in a self-interested manner, especially amongst participants
with a“proself”social value orientation.Young adolescents seemed
to differentiate less between the three emotions compared to late
adolescents.
ADOLESCENTS VS. ADULTS
Based on previous research with adult participants (Van Dijk
et al., 2008; Van Kleef et al., 2010; Lelieveld et al., 2013a), we
hypothesized that anger would lead to more unfair offers than
happiness and disappointment. Angry expressions indeed led to
more unfair offers than disappointed expressions, which empha-
sizes the importance of studying discrete emotional expressions
instead of valence alone. Both anger and disappointment are reac-
tions to undesirable behavior of others, and both communicate a
wish for a behavioral change in the other (VanDijk andZeelenberg,
2002). However, a difference between disappointment and anger is
that disappointment might lead to more fair offers via a feeling of
guilt, whereas anger might instead lead to more unfair offers when
communicated from a low-power position (which was the case in
our study) because of reciprocal anger (Lelieveld et al., 2011,2012).
Disappointment also differs fromanger and happiness because it is
regarded more complex than the basic emotions of anger and hap-
piness. However, research suggests that disappointment and anger
are two of the most frequently expressed negative emotions (Van
Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002; Lelieveld et al., 2011). We were inter-
ested how different negative emotions that signal dissatisfaction
would impact offers by adolescents. Future studies may include
other basic emotions such as sadness to contrast different basic
emotions.
The current results fromanadolescent samplediffer partly from
previous ﬁndings using the same paradigm with adults (Lelieveld
et al., 2013a). The adolescents in our study made more unfair
offers in response to happy and angry reactions compared to dis-
appointed reactions, while the adults in the Lelieveld et al. (2013a)
study only made lower offers in response to angry (and not happy)
reactions. When reading happy reactions the adolescents possibly
inferred that the happy other was satisﬁed with the previous unfair
offer, and accordingly chose more unfair offers (Van Kleef et al.,
2010). This is in line with the idea that the general function of pos-
itive emotions is to serve as a cue to continue the current course
of action (Cacioppo and Gardner, 1999). Previous studies with
adults showed this pattern of utilization of happiness as well (Van
Kleef et al., 2004). However, the effect of happiness was mainly
driven by the proself (SVO) participants in the oldest age group in
our sample (see below).
AGE EFFECTS
Our analyses didnot reveal any effects of age on the total amount of
unfair offers. Previous studies also found that fairness preferences
(as measured with the Dictator Game) do not seem to change sub-
stantially after childhood (Gummerum et al., 2008; Gürog˘lu et al.,
2009; Steinbeis et al., 2012). However, since older adolescents are
better at considering consequences of their decisions for others
(Crone, 2013) and we expected the adolescents to increasingly
take the situational context (i.e., different emotional reactions)
into account when growing older, we analyzed effects of emotional
reactions separately for three age groups. Although we did not ﬁnd
an interaction between age and the offers after the different emo-
tions, we did ﬁnd differences when we compared the interpersonal
effects of the discrete emotions within the separate age groups.
This analysis suggested that the youngest adolescents did not dif-
ferentiate between the three emotions, while older adolescents did.
Only the older adolescents made less unfair offers in response
to disappointed expressions compared to angry and happy
expressions.
Although future studies are needed to conﬁrm these results, the
ﬁnding that younger adolescents seem tomake less use of informa-
tion conveyed in others’ emotions than older adolescents is in line
with previous research on emotion recognition and perspective-
taking. Possibly, younger adolescents are less able at distinguishing
thewritten emotional expressions, as previously observed for facial
expressions of the six basic emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness,
anger, fear, disgust, and surprise; Wade et al., 2006) and anger
and fear speciﬁcally (Thomas et al., 2007). However, we have no
reason to believe that adolescents did not perceive the correct emo-
tion from the different reactions, since most disappointed, angry,
and happy statements contained the words disappointed, angry,
or happy respectively (or any clear synonym). Verbally presented
emotions might also be processed differently with increasing age,
as was found in younger children (Jenkins and Ball, 2000). In addi-
tion, more mixed feelings in response to social emotion scenarios
have been linked to pubertal development in young adolescents
(Burnett et al., 2011b), suggesting more complex understanding
of verbally described emotions with advancing puberty. Hence,
the difference between the youngest and oldest adolescents in the
current study seems to reﬂect an improvement with age in under-
standing emotions and incorporating emotional information into
decision-making.
In addition to behavioral evidence, several neuroimaging stud-
ies have revealed that brain regions important for social decisions
are changing during adolescence (reviewed in Burnett et al., 2011a;
Crone and Dahl, 2012). For example, age-related increases in
temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) activation were observed when
adolescents played the Trust Game, in which it is important to
take the perspective of the other player into account (Van den Bos
et al., 2010). In adults, heightened TPJ activation in response to
happy reactions was found using the paradigm employed in the
current study (Lelieveld et al., 2013a). An interesting but spec-
ulative direction for future research would be to investigate if
the increased amount of unfair offers in response to happiness
is related to lower TPJ activity in adolescents compared to adults.
SOCIAL VALUE ORIENTATION
In order to evaluate individual personality differences in responses
to others’ emotions we measured social value orientation. The
hypothesis that proselfs would make more unfair offers in gen-
eral than prosocials was conﬁrmed, although the effect was only
marginally signiﬁcant. Additionally, as considered above, the
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higher amount of unfair offers in response to happy reactions
in our study can be attributed to proself (SVO) participants who
made more unfair offers than prosocial participants in this condi-
tion (see Figure 2). It is possible that proselfs perceived the other’s
happinesswith apreviousunfair offer as a signal of satisfaction that
could be answeredwithmore unfairness. Prosocialsmay have liked
the happy others more and therefore may have made less unfair
offers. Previous studies have demonstrated that proselfs tend to
be more concerned about their own outcomes in allocation games
than prosocials (Parks, 1994; Balliet et al., 2009). In the current
study, proselfs tended to be somewhat more selﬁsh in general,
but not univocally egocentric. Proselfs did not differ from proso-
cials in their choices after disappointed and angry expressions.
It appears that proselfs only act more selﬁshly in certain situa-
tions (Ketelaar and Au, 2003; Van Kleef and Van Lange, 2008),
such as acting upon the perceived satisfaction that was signaled
by the happy others in our study. Future research could investi-
gate these underlying mechanisms, and further explore whether
SVO also modulates other positive emotions such as gratitude and
hope.
LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
There are several limitations in the current study. First, the small
effect of age that we found within our sample should be treated
with caution. Our ﬁndings require replication, preferably in stud-
ies that directly compare children, adolescents, and adults. Second,
the emotions in our study were verbal expressions presented on
a computer screen, which may lead to concerns about ecological
validity. We used verbal expressions since there is no typical facial
expression for disappointment. Since emotions can be expressed
in a variety of other (non-verbal) ways, future research is needed
to conﬁrm whether these effects are generalizable to more natu-
ral settings. Previous research suggests that ﬁndings with verbally
expressed emotions (Van Kleef et al., 2004) are comparable with
those of studies using face-to-face negotiations (Kopelman et al.,
2006; Sinaceur and Tiedens, 2006) or facial emotional expres-
sions (Pietroni et al., 2008). Furthermore, computer-mediated
communication is well-established among adolescents, since the
vast majority are Internet and social network users (Madden
et al., 2013). However, these online interactions naturally differ
from the experimental paradigm that participants engaged in for
this study. Future research could investigate if similar results are
found with face-to-face interactions for this particular paradigm.
Third, participants reported to lose interest in the experiment
toward the end of the task. The 60 trials in which participants
had to choose between the same distributions may have been
too repetitive. Future studies could avoid this problem by alter-
nating between different options for fair and unfair distributions
or by simply presenting less than 60 trials (e.g., 30 trials as in
the current analyses). In the current study, we chose to discard
the second half of the trials before performing any analyses, to
avoid the inclusion of trials that are confounded by lower partic-
ipant motivation and/or concentration. Finally, with the current
design, we were not able to study the underlying mechanisms of
participants’ fairness decisions. Future research may investigate
interpersonal effects of emotions in adolescence focused on the
underlying (affective) reactions; this could be realized by adding
a post-questionnaire to assess feelings of, for example, guilt and
anger of participants.
So far, only two studies (with adult participants) have used
neuroimaging to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying the
effects of emotions in interactions (Ruz andTudela, 2011; Lelieveld
et al., 2013a). Future studies might use similar experiments to shed
light on the developing brain in social interactions. Furthermore, it
would be interesting to seewhether psychiatric populations known
for problems in empathy and emotion recognition might process
interpersonal emotions in a different way, such as autism spec-
trumdisorders or psychopathy (Blair, 2005; Kennedy andAdolphs,
2012). In addition, future work may include other discrete emo-
tions such as sadness in order to ﬁnd out whether there are other
emotions that will inﬂuence younger adolescents’ fairness deci-
sions differently. Furthermore, studies can be designed to examine
the effects of emotions in situations beyond allocation games such
as cooperative settings.
CONCLUSION
The current study aimed to elucidate the role of interpersonal emo-
tions in the context of social interaction in adolescence. In general,
adolescents reacted with more generous offers after disappointed
reactions from peers compared to angry or happy reactions. We
also provide preliminary evidence for a developmental increase of
incorporating emotional information in social decisions within
adolescence. Furthermore, individual differences in SVO were
related to reactions upon happiness: proselfs made more unfair
offers to happy others than prosocials. Our results emphasize the
importance of distinguishing between different types of emotions
during social interactions in adolescence and the role of social
value orientation. We hope that this study provides a fruitful
starting point for the investigation of the interpersonal effects of
emotions in adolescence.
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